Why Misinformation Must Not Be Ignored
Students waiting for the bus in Sydney, Australia, in November. The country’s new law barring children from using social media has helped fuel emotional debate across the world, including those related to mis- and disinformation. Photo by Matthew Abbott for The New York Times
PUBLICATION
PsycNet / American Psychological Association
AUTHORS
Ullrich K. H. Ecker, University of Western Australia
Li Qian Tay, Australian National University
Jon Roozenbeek, University of Cambridge
Sander van der Linden, University of Cambridge
John Cook, University of Melbourne
Naomi Oreskes, Harvard University
Stephan Lewandowsky, University of Bristol
ABSTRACT
Recent academic debate has seen the emergence of the claim that misinformation is not a significant societal problem. We argue that the arguments used to support this minimizing position are flawed, particularly if interpreted (e.g., by policymakers or the public) as suggesting that misinformation can be safely ignored. Here, we rebut the two main claims, namely that misinformation is not of substantive concern (a) due to its low incidence and (b) because it has no causal influence on notable political or behavioral outcomes. Through a critical review of the current literature, we demonstrate that (a) the prevalence of misinformation is nonnegligible if reasonably inclusive definitions are applied and that (b) misinformation has causal impacts on important beliefs and behaviors. Both scholars and policymakers should therefore continue to take misinformation seriously.
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